9 comments

  • keks24 45 minutes ago
    Gentoo Linux users are adviced to update the package "app-misc/ca-certificates" to version "20260816.3.125" or higher!:

        # emerge --sync
        # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-misc/ca-certificates-20260816.3.125"
    
    To check via "curl":

        $ curl --url="https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
        $ curl --url="https://dv-g3b-aaa-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/"
    
    They should return:

        curl: (60) SSL certificate OpenSSL verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20)
        More details here: https://curl.se/docs/sslcerts.html
    
        curl failed to verify the legitimacy of the server and therefore could not
        establish a secure connection to it. To learn more about this situation and
        how to fix it, please visit the webpage mentioned above.
    
    ---

    * GLSA 202610-01: https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202610-01

    * https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

  • darkwater 3 minutes ago
    This is news for NIST but old news generally speaking, being the eMudhra debacle. Or am I missing something?
  • dathinab 4 minutes ago
    It's a bit surprising that this took ~1.5days to end up on HN.
  • asqueella 41 minutes ago
    This seems to be about ‘go’ proactively blocking emudhra certs even though the system trust store is out of date? https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6809
  • colinmarc 31 minutes ago
    TL;DR:

    The very urgent uv/certifi/etc releases (and yet-to-be-done bun release) are about removing the compromised CAs as described here:

    https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

    In other words, that software bundled the compromised certs into the binary, so upgrading it is the only way to remove them.

    This is about Go proactively blocking intermediates. Which shouldn't strictly be necessary as long as your OS has removed or distrusted the CAs (on my laptop, macOS has done that, although it seems like it did so in a way not all tools have access to; for example, rustls-platform-verifier respects it, but rustls-webpki still loads the bad CAs from the system trust store).

    edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN

    • fabioborellini 4 minutes ago
      I wonder if they made this change with an assumption that the root CAs wouldn't be distrusted later same day, too.
    • t_mahmood 23 minutes ago
      > edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN

        You can, two space at the start of each line
  • imeron 47 minutes ago
    It's down for me, are they on PHP? :D
  • zkmon 40 minutes ago
    Great. The technology has progressed enough to kill the existing technologies. It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark that eats away all the fish while the fish proudly announce that their great creation (shark) as the frontier progress for their fish race.
    • cedilla 1 minute ago
      Here a CA derived a secret key from the number 4.

      If you think "that's weird to see such a small number in key generation" than you're one step ahead of whoever generated that key.

      Unfortunately, unlike with RSA, small primes are not apparent in elliptic cryptography.

    • colinmarc 35 minutes ago
      The eMudhra CA compromises had nothing to do with LLMs? But I love the vibes.
  • galadran 38 minutes ago
  • speedgoose 13 minutes ago
    Cock-up or conspiracy?