My dad headed up the redesign effort on the Lockheed Martin side to remove the foam PAL ramps (where the chunk of foam that broke off and hit the orbiter came from) from the external tank, as part of return-to-flight after the Columbia disaster. At the time he was the last one left at the company from when they had previously investigated removing those ramps from the design. He told me how he went from basically working on this project off in a corner on his own, to suddenly having millions of dollars in funding and flying all over for wind tunnel tests when it became clear to NASA that return-to-flight couldn't happen without removing the ramps.
I don't think his name has ever come up in all the histories of this—some Lockheed policy about not letting their employees be publicly credited in papers—but he's got an array of internal awards from this time around his desk at home (he's now retired). I've always been proud of him for this.
This isn't a failure of PowerPoint. I work for NASA and we still use it all the time, and I'll assure anyone that the communication errors are rife regardless of what medium we're working in. The issue is differences in the way that in-the-weeds engineers and managers interpret technical information, which is alluded to in the article but the author still focuses on the bullets and the PowerPoint, as if rewriting similar facts in a technical paper would change everything.
My own colleagues fall victim to this all the time (luckily I do not work in any capacity where someone's life is directly on the line as a result of my work.) Recently, a colleague won an award for helping managers make a decision about a mission parameter, but he was confused because they chose a parameter value he didn't like. His problem is that, like many engineers, he thought that providing the technical context he discovered that led him to his conclusion was as effective as presenting his conclusion. It never is; if you want to be heard by managers, and really understood even by your colleagues, you have to say things up front that come across as overly simple, controversial, and poorly-founded, and then you can reveal your analyses as people question you.
I've seen this over and over again, and I'm starting to think it's a personality trait. Engineers are gossiping among themselves, saying "X will never work". They get to the meeting with the managers and present "30 different analyses showing X is marginally less effective than Y and Z" instead of just throwing up a slide that says "X IS STUPID AND WE SHOULDN'T DO IT." Luckily for me, I'm not a very good engineer, so when I'm along for the ride I generally translate well into Managerese.
I love it when some company gets one of the engineers to do a demonstration, you know you got an actual engineer because it will be the worst sales pitch you ever received. They will tell you in excruciating detail all the problems with their product. Recognize and cherish these moments for what they are worth, despite the terrible presentation it is infinitely more valuable than yet another sales rat making untenable promises.
It is something to do with that being the engineers actual job, to find and understand the problems with the product. so when talking to a customer, that is what tends to come across, all the problematic stuff. The good stuff that works, not important to them.
I was just reading a great discussion about how "academics use qualifiers as to how confident they are in the information" and you can see similar trends in spaces like hacker news.
But using "uncertain" language seems unconvincing to people outside of these types of cultures.
- bad communication possible in any medium
- pptx in NASA even today!
- issue is managers/SMEs communication differences
- issues with technical papers
- long
- boring
- vs word, excel, pdf...
(Next slide please)
Manager/SME Differences
- context vs conclusion
- tell a compelling story
- but give away the ending FIRST
- inherent personality differences
- motivations/incentives/mindsets
(Next slide)
Learning from disasters
- medium guides message and messenger
- blame tool - binary choice?
- presentation aide vs distributed technical artifact
If nothing else it's quite hard/uncommon to print out a PowerPoint and read it carefully in a quiet room by yourself, I do this with written stuff all the time.
>if you want to be heard... and really understood ... you have to say things up front that come across as overly simple, controversial, and poorly-founded, and then you can reveal your analyses as people question you.
I question your premise. :J
I'm just kidding, that's interesting I'll have to think about applying that. I don't suppose that would translate over to blogging? The fear of course is that one makes a statement and the commentariat thinks the speaker is full of it for not having provided backup instead of questioning. Maybe it's dependent on what type of forum it is.
This article (as it makes clear) owes it's analysis at least largely to what Tufte has written about the Challenger disaster (1986) and Columbia Disaster (2003). He wrote about the Columbia one more fully in the second edition of The Cognitive Style of Powerpoint.
Given that the link in the article to his report on his website is now broken, people might be interested in teh few page grabs that he has included in the "comments" on his site here[0].
See also the article that he has re-posted under the "comments" section on his page on the matter[1].
I don't see how this has anything to do with PowerPoint. There wasn't clear communication; the medium was completely incidental to that. They could have been writing on a chalkboard and had a communication failure, does that mean that chalkboards should be blamed in that case?
Because the medium is not conducive to dense amount of technical information that readers are expected to use to make or understand decisions. Other similar mediums like a chalkboard were not singled out because the problem was identified with PowerPoint specifically. And it wasn't a choice of mediums all with similar problems, but slides vs papers. From the article,
> “The Board views the endemic use of PowerPoint briefing slides instead of technical papers as an illustration of the problematic methods of technical communication at NASA.”
But the problem, if anything, was that too much dense information was conveyed at all. Based on the analysis in the post, of the engineers had replaced that slide with one that said "Don't go forward with reentry", that might have saved lives better than any change in medium. To be clear, I'm in favor of abolishing PowerPoint for any non-ephemeral use, but the problem here was focus and framing of the info.
* Our foam collision dataset from experimentation only included pieces below X cu in.
* Evidence points to this piece being at least Y cu in - 200 times more massive
* Catastrophic damage to the wing cannot be ruled out
This would have been a great PowerPoint, and I'm not convinced handing them only an academic paper with dozens of pages of facts and figures would have had the effect that my above deck would have had.
Agree. Though to be honest I still think a paper with an executive summary that said "Don't go forward etc" would have probably been even better. Then the powerpoint slides can be illustrations of how far outside the testing data this is, simulations of possible damage, and other, you know, useful stuff.
Would it be better if you sent them a PDF document instead? There seems to be an assumption here that if you send the stakeholders a larger volume of information they will take the time to read it. Is that a valid assumption?
Memos and reports also ask the author to try to explain things clearly and at length, a PowerPoint, even a technical one is usually figures and bullet points
Speaking of chalkboards, next time you have to give a presentation, bring a chalkboard and do your slides in realtime. Something about the visual show, auditory overload, and not least the novelty of the act makes it much more impactful and memorial than "another powerpoint that puts you to sleep"
White boards are... ok... better than powerpoint but still fail to sell it like a chalkboard does. I think it is the noise.
Yeah, the choice to gloss over the point "our tests are not relevant" was a deliberate one. If it was in a paper you'd have big fancy graphs of the tests and you'd have to do your own work to compare the x axis against a mention of the actual scale in question in another paragraph. It's not as if they started with "Warning: even the 600X smaller bits we tested can damage the wing" and microsoft just kind of spontaneously grew a bunch of random stuff above the fold. It's a kind of chickenshit communication which you can do in any medium. The point they ought to be making is not dense or technical, it is so simple a child could understand.
This was an interesting article but it doesn't really provide solutions. I watched a few tech talks teaching a new API. Most slides were split, left side bullet poitns, right side either code or an image. As I was watching I was thinking "isn't this supposed to be almost the worst style"? but I was also thinking "I can't think of any way to do this better". It's an API. It requires examples. And it requires something describing what to concentrate on, what the example or image is showing.
I've been the plenty of great talks with just images, no words. But they fit the type of talk. I'm not sure an API talk would be better without bullet points. If you know of some to reference, please post links.
Tufte did make specific recommendations that one should prepare a real document that your audience can and should read, and that they would have in front of them during the meeting. I'm not sure how best to translate that to your API example.
What would make the most important point of that slide stand out any more in a "real document" than in a slideshow? If anything, I would expect it to be buried even more - a slide and limited-time presentation forces you to be concise, while in a document there tend to be few limits on length.
I would say the disaster occurred despite PowerPoint, not because of it. It's not clear to me at all why the slide author thought all that text was needed, when it seems to communicate almost nothing. If anything I would blame it on the culture around "real documents", where having more information is treated as better (probably because they serve multiple functions - to educate, but also as a record of activities), even if it makes it bloated and hard to read.
I found it surprising that the slide in the article uses Calibri, a typeface that wasn’t publicly available at the time. The original discussion confirms that the slide in the article is a recreation of the original one:
> The slide in the article has the same text, but is a recreation of the original (The Calibri typeface used wasn't part of PowerPoint until 2007).
> The original slide can be seen in the full report linked in the article:
A 2008 episode of the PBS NOVA program covers the Columbia disaster. It does not get into the focus of the article posted here, but it does well covering how poorly the situation was handled (along with other things like the broad history of the Shuttle program).
No, that's not how the physics works. The foam is moving at the same velocity as the shuttle when it breaks off, and had a short time to accelerate(decelerate) before hitting the shuttle.
THANK YOU. I've seen the velocity of the space shuttle quoted as the speed that the foam had when it hit Columbia's wing so many times, and it bugs the crap out of me.
If that was the actual impact velocity of the foam, there would not be any doubt about whether the shuttle would survive reentry, that is if it even managed to make it all the way into space.
The problem with sending up another shuttle is they hadn't actually fixed the underlying foam problem. If there was another foam strike on the rescue shuttle, now they have two craft in orbit with crew on that can't re-enter
> There was actually an exercise done to work this out, at the direction of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). [...] In the CAIB’s scenario, Atlantis would have launched with a four-person crew: two pilots, and two EVA mission specialists. [...]
> A Columbia rescue mission would have been the most monumentally difficult and epic space mission in history, and it would have required absolutely everything going right to bring the crew home safely. But NASA has shown time and again its ability to rise to the occasion and bring its formidable engineering and piloting expertise to bear. Instead, the worst instincts of the agency - to micromanage and engage in wishful thinking instead of clear-eyed analysis - doomed the crew.
They did a bunch of studies. While it was POSSIBLE to get a rescue shuttle up to them if they ignored a bunch of safety and refurbishment procedures, the sheer amount of complexities probably meant they would lose 2 shuttles and 2 crew.
The second shuttle would've flown with a crew of two, working with the knowledge that their ship was even more vulnerable than the one they intended to rescue.
One option would have been to place whatever high melting point metal tools they could spare into the hole, and freeze water around them to hold it in place. It also might have been possible to change the series of s-curves and other maneuvers done during re-entry, in order to lessen the heating on the left wing.
> Why, given that the foam strike had occurred at a force massively out of test conditions had NASA proceeded with re-entry?
What was the alternative?
Columbia could not have made it to ISS.
Columbia could not have repaired the damage in orbit.
Columbia could not have lasted, after two weeks in space, long enough to launch a rescue mission.
I know the "In Flight Options Assessment" said they could launch at an accelerated pace but the assessment assumes that it's ok to launch another vehicle with the same problem, no fix, and no completed analysis of the cause.
Yeah, they suspected the external tank bipod foam, but WHY did the foam come off? Was it a fluke? Had some unknown factor not present in previous external tank bipod foam applications but now present in all external tank bipod foam applications manifested?
>Two major assumptions, apart from the already stated assumption that the damage had to be visible, have to be recognized – the first is that there were no problems during the preparation and rollout of Atlantis, and the second is the question of whether NASA and the government would have deemed it acceptable to launch Atlantis with exposure to the same events that had damaged Columbia. At this point, at least two of the last three flights (STS-112 and STS-107) had bipod ramp foam problems, and the flight in-between these two, STS-113, was a night launch without adequate imaging of the External Tank during ascent.
This is from a pre-flight safety report for STS-113
>“More than 100 External Tanks have flown with only 3 documented instances of significant foam loss on a bipod ramp”
STS-1 through STS-111, April 1981 - June 2002: three "significant" bipod foam losses
STS-112, October 2002: significant foam loss
STS-113, November 2002: night time, but they saw 112 and went "oh shit" and wrote a report
STS-107, January 2003: yet another, fatal, significant foam loss
If two of the last three flights had foam problems and the one that didn't only didn't because you couldn't see if it did, and over 100 of the preceding flights only had three, you don't risk four more lives.
Everyone should note that the slides in this blog post are fabricated, and the author of this post misrepresents Tufte and the conclusions of the review board—subtly pointing people in a direction that's the exact opposite of the real takeaways from the investigation. It's almost insidious.
The first time I came across this blog post a few years ago, I found it enraging, and I still do. As I said I said in my personal notes at the time, "The choice to use this fabricated material for this article and the false claims in it—claims not actually confirmed by the sources that it cites—amounts to what would be considered serious misconduct elsewhere." But there's no real accountability here, of course, because at the end of the day it's just some jerk with a blog serving up distorted pop science insights to aspiring entrepreneurs.
For once I will defend PowerPoint: 1/ the slide is atrocious, even by 2003 standard 2/ you don't decide on the life or death based on a crappy slide you don't understand.
As an engineer, that slide looks completely reasonable to me. Its purpose was to communicate technical info, which it did adequately. Keep in mind that the subject matter is highly technical, given that we're literally talking about the Space Shuttle, and more than a high school level of reading comprehension is heavily implied. If the NASA personnel weren't competent enough to review technical data without a pithy summary, that's on them.
The slide shown here is completely horrendous, even by 2003 standard. I've worked in a field as technical as this one for a long time, and this slide would not pass a review, even with people familiar with the content.
While it does not wash the responsibility of the executives, the engineers have also the responsibility to be clear in their communication
Oh I thought you were talking about NASA and the Columbia disaster. The PowerPoint slide was poorly designed, as it says in the story. The problem was not PowerPoint though. You could summarize it using a PDF, and it will still have the problem if key issues don't grab attention.
The point that seems lost on HN, who evidently are incapable of consuming information that isn't presented in a format designed by Jony Ive himself, is that there's nothing wrong with the format of the slide to the kind of skilled subject matter expert in the aerospace industry that should have been reviewing it on NASA's behalf.
But that's not how it works in most large organizations. The person who has the authority to make the decision is not necessarily an SME in all of the areas they have to make decisions. Rather, they rely on SMEs to do the investigation and then... communicate properly.
For reference, NASA asked the group of aerospace engineers ("rocket scientists") who designed the Space Shuttle to provide them with a technical analysis of the effects of foam impacts, and then subsequently lost the Columbia with all hands because they couldn't exercise more than a high school level of reading comprehension. The engineers presented the facts as they were understood, only stopping short of doing NASA's job for them by deciding to abort reentry.
If you can't consume the PhD-level analysis that you requested because you only have a high school reading level, despite having been tasked with safely operating what was arguably the most technically complicated piece of technology in existence at the time, then there's really no other excuse for that level of incompetence.
Let's presume you are correct. The Boeing engineers who made this slide were geniuses. The NASA managers consuming it were dullards. If the Boeing engineers were so smart, why didn't they write for their audience?
I am consistently ranked as both one of the best engineers in my company and one of the best communicators. I would never make a slide like that for any audience. It's shit writing for non-engineers and it's shit writing for engineers, too.
You have got to get over whatever this hangup is about "PhD level analysis". That phrase doesn't mean anything.
I'm not arguing that it was a good slide: just extremely average in the context that it was created. If there was a problem with communication, then it was solely on the reader for not being fluent in their own field. The engineers were presenting a nuanced view of their data, which went above the heads of the NASA personnel who were evidently only capable of interpreting a simple "yes or no" answer.
I can't remember the last time I saw a slide as mangled as the one in the article. It hurts my brain just reading it.
But you are right, most engineers would consider that reasonable, while complaining about the "muggles" that just don't get it.
As a Software Architect, one of my main responsibilities has been to take information presented like above and turn it into something that non-technical people can digest.
Being able to express a complex concept in simple terms is an invaluable skill.
Actually most engineers would complain about the slides shown here. The issue is not the technicality or depth of the content but on the way it is presented and shown. I'm
That's a completely unremarkable slide in the aerospace industry. If there was a communication problem, it was with the NASA personnel not being able to operate in their own field.
I spent too much if my early career dealing with the consequences of bad decisions made on “good data”. If the presentation was so good why did they come to the wrong conclusions? It became part of my overall thesis that good design invites you to use a thing the proper way even if you failed to read the instructions.
You can’t force someone to think but you can force a lot of people not to, or you can make it difficult to avoid. It’s worth investing the energy into stacking the deck the right way.
"That's on them" is not acceptable for an engineer when lives are on the line. Part of your job is making people understand what they need to understand. If their lack of understanding means people die, then you need to do your job and figure out how to communicate effectively to the audience you have, not the audience you want.
There’s a famous speech someone related from their civil engineering professor, where the professor basically said, if I pass you in this class I am effectively giving you a license to kill. So some of you will not be passing.
The assumption of competency goes both ways. The NASA personnel should have been able to understand a very standard slide in their field, that any college-educated fluent English speaker would have been able to grasp.
My CS undergrad was in the engineering college and so I had a mandatory engineering seminar that was basically "don't get people killed with your work." We covered Challenger, Hyatt Regency, and some other classic failures. I've mostly avoided working on life-critical software so it's not an immediate concern, but that sense of responsibility still stuck with me.
Also attended an engineering school. I had to take way too much chem and physics. It was weird.
I can be kind of a pain in the ass when it comes to details so I’ve worked on a couple such projects. It’s sobering, but also I think, “better me than” half a dozen corner cutters at my last two jobs. They could do much worse.
That said, I stayed on a commercial aerospace project about 14 months after I didn’t really want to be there because people kept saying the wrong things in meetings and thinking they sounded right.
First of all, is that actually their level of education or are you just making stuff up?
Second, that's irrelevant to my point that the engineer is responsible for communicating, not just figuring stuff out. You cannot say "if you don't get it, that's your problem" when their not getting it means people die.
The slide in the OP is a completely standard way of commumicating information in the aerospace industry. If the NASA personnel had problems understanding this slide, then they also had problems understanding virtually every other piece of technical info that was ever communicated to them by a third party. College level reading comprehension means being able to understand nuance, which this slide conveys.
They should have made it abundantly clear that they had no idea what was going to happen and that loss of the crew and shuttle was a real possibility, but I agree with you.
This slide was presented with a verbal talk track, and anyone who can't handle focusing on the topic because the slide is boring shouldn't be in a position of responsibility.
There's a near infinite quantity of technical information to choose from. The purpose is to emphasize what is important, and de-emphasize the unimportant. When I look at that slide, I see 95% utterly irrelevant information, and a teeny tiny note saying, in vague and indirect language, that the impact was 600x worse than any test.
So on the remote chance you're not just trolling: If you're doing anything safety critical, please quit your job before you kill someone. You vastly overestimate human's (including yours) ability to process information. I am being 100% sincere.
I've been slowly refining a pitch deck over the past couple years and the feedback from reviews and test pitches has strongly reinforced for me just how important it is for slides to be short and laid out precisely.
You want the most important information in the right places, communicated with as few words as possible, using the most accurate words possible.
You want the key takeaways to be the things that people are most likely to remember from each slide.
You want to minimize distractions and try not to pollute slides with a bunch of vaguely related stuff. A crowded slide risks communicating nothing.
It's a real dramatic change compared to how I am used to using powerpoint for technical audiences or when I had to make presentations during school.
One of the dynamics is that if there is too much text they’ll read instead of listening to you. Another is that if the conclusion is on the deck, they’ll get bored waiting for you to get to the punchline they’ve already read, and that can lose your audience as well.
So you’re better off either opening with the conclusion or putting it on the next slide, but accidentally jumping two slides forward can still ruin your audience’s attention span. So sometimes it’s better for it not to be in the deck at all.
it's also important to know your audience. If they've spent their career reading technical papers or dense prose, that's one thing.
If they've largely grown up in the social media era and click away from reels/shorts that don't have animated captions, you'd design a very different deck.
Another example of "guy can't spell" => "he's retarded". If you can't get everything right, you probably got lots of things wrong.
It also shows why software engineers are superior engineers. The history of software engineering has some single-digit kills, at most 20 in total. Meanwhile, shuttle engineers are supposed to be the best in the aerospace business and they've lost some 13 or so? All aerospace would be put in the thousands.
An old saying is "Any fool can build a bridge. It takes an engineer to build a bridge that barely stands". But these are fools who built bridges that didn't stand.
One day, I will teach them real engineering: It is Rails backend with React frontend. Zero kills. Life above all.
That's a good counterexample. We can count that in software engineering. Can't say I expected Boeing software engineers to be any good. Dregs of the field but they still count as in the field. Aerospace software engineering quality substantially lacking, it's true.
I don't think his name has ever come up in all the histories of this—some Lockheed policy about not letting their employees be publicly credited in papers—but he's got an array of internal awards from this time around his desk at home (he's now retired). I've always been proud of him for this.
To folks out there: do the important work, not the glamorous work, and you'll not only sleep well, but you might actually matter as well.
My own colleagues fall victim to this all the time (luckily I do not work in any capacity where someone's life is directly on the line as a result of my work.) Recently, a colleague won an award for helping managers make a decision about a mission parameter, but he was confused because they chose a parameter value he didn't like. His problem is that, like many engineers, he thought that providing the technical context he discovered that led him to his conclusion was as effective as presenting his conclusion. It never is; if you want to be heard by managers, and really understood even by your colleagues, you have to say things up front that come across as overly simple, controversial, and poorly-founded, and then you can reveal your analyses as people question you.
I've seen this over and over again, and I'm starting to think it's a personality trait. Engineers are gossiping among themselves, saying "X will never work". They get to the meeting with the managers and present "30 different analyses showing X is marginally less effective than Y and Z" instead of just throwing up a slide that says "X IS STUPID AND WE SHOULDN'T DO IT." Luckily for me, I'm not a very good engineer, so when I'm along for the ride I generally translate well into Managerese.
It is something to do with that being the engineers actual job, to find and understand the problems with the product. so when talking to a customer, that is what tends to come across, all the problematic stuff. The good stuff that works, not important to them.
But using "uncertain" language seems unconvincing to people outside of these types of cultures.
Also of course the power dynamics.
In my mind, I'm thinking "so long as a meteor doesn't cause an extinction event," but the manager graciously pushes the target date back a week.
Manager/SME Differences
(Next slide)Learning from disasters
(Next slide)Questions?
I question your premise. :J
I'm just kidding, that's interesting I'll have to think about applying that. I don't suppose that would translate over to blogging? The fear of course is that one makes a statement and the commentariat thinks the speaker is full of it for not having provided backup instead of questioning. Maybe it's dependent on what type of forum it is.
It would have been nicer if that had been the first sentence of that (interesting) comment.
https://norvig.com/Gettysburg/
Given that the link in the article to his report on his website is now broken, people might be interested in teh few page grabs that he has included in the "comments" on his site here[0].
See also the article that he has re-posted under the "comments" section on his page on the matter[1].
[0]: https://www.edwardtufte.com/notebook/new-edition-of-the-cogn... [1]: https://www.edwardtufte.com/notebook/the-columbia-evidence/
https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/v2appf.htm
The words "a safety factor of three" will live with me for every day of my life.
> “The Board views the endemic use of PowerPoint briefing slides instead of technical papers as an illustration of the problematic methods of technical communication at NASA.”
Slide 1: 48-point font
Slide 2: 24-point font This would have been a great PowerPoint, and I'm not convinced handing them only an academic paper with dozens of pages of facts and figures would have had the effect that my above deck would have had.Jeff bezos iirc speaks at length about this.
White boards are... ok... better than powerpoint but still fail to sell it like a chalkboard does. I think it is the noise.
> Think about your message. Don’t let that message be lost
That was the important bit of the article. Regardless the medium, ensuring you deliver the message you want should always be the driving point.
Also: Yes to less slides and more Position Papers (but keep em brief please :-D)
He has a legendary hatred of PowerPoint.
https://www.edwardtufte.com/product/the-cognitive-style-of-p...
I've been the plenty of great talks with just images, no words. But they fit the type of talk. I'm not sure an API talk would be better without bullet points. If you know of some to reference, please post links.
I would say the disaster occurred despite PowerPoint, not because of it. It's not clear to me at all why the slide author thought all that text was needed, when it seems to communicate almost nothing. If anything I would blame it on the culture around "real documents", where having more information is treated as better (probably because they serve multiple functions - to educate, but also as a record of activities), even if it makes it bloated and hard to read.
A presentation accompanied by a document can be more easily done with punchy slides because the detail is in the document.
I found it surprising that the slide in the article uses Calibri, a typeface that wasn’t publicly available at the time. The original discussion confirms that the slide in the article is a recreation of the original one:
> The slide in the article has the same text, but is a recreation of the original (The Calibri typeface used wasn't part of PowerPoint until 2007).
> The original slide can be seen in the full report linked in the article:
> https://www.edwardtufte.com
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6t48bc2dyzo
https://justin.searls.co/posts/sprinkling-self-doubt-on-chat...
Found the chapter here: https://williamwolff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/tufte-ch...
No, that's not how the physics works. The foam is moving at the same velocity as the shuttle when it breaks off, and had a short time to accelerate(decelerate) before hitting the shuttle.
If they did a spacewalk and found the damage, what were their options?
> A Columbia rescue mission would have been the most monumentally difficult and epic space mission in history, and it would have required absolutely everything going right to bring the crew home safely. But NASA has shown time and again its ability to rise to the occasion and bring its formidable engineering and piloting expertise to bear. Instead, the worst instincts of the agency - to micromanage and engage in wishful thinking instead of clear-eyed analysis - doomed the crew.
https://www.quora.com/If-NASA-had-known-ahead-of-time-Columb...
A much more deeply researched article here:
https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue...
I can’t imagine it will ever happen, it will be such a bad look for NASA
What was the alternative?
Columbia could not have made it to ISS.
Columbia could not have repaired the damage in orbit.
Columbia could not have lasted, after two weeks in space, long enough to launch a rescue mission.
I know the "In Flight Options Assessment" said they could launch at an accelerated pace but the assessment assumes that it's ok to launch another vehicle with the same problem, no fix, and no completed analysis of the cause.
Yeah, they suspected the external tank bipod foam, but WHY did the foam come off? Was it a fluke? Had some unknown factor not present in previous external tank bipod foam applications but now present in all external tank bipod foam applications manifested?
>Two major assumptions, apart from the already stated assumption that the damage had to be visible, have to be recognized – the first is that there were no problems during the preparation and rollout of Atlantis, and the second is the question of whether NASA and the government would have deemed it acceptable to launch Atlantis with exposure to the same events that had damaged Columbia. At this point, at least two of the last three flights (STS-112 and STS-107) had bipod ramp foam problems, and the flight in-between these two, STS-113, was a night launch without adequate imaging of the External Tank during ascent.
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/caib/news/report/pdf/vol2/pa... (page 397)
That's not a valid assumption.
This is from a pre-flight safety report for STS-113
>“More than 100 External Tanks have flown with only 3 documented instances of significant foam loss on a bipod ramp”
STS-1 through STS-111, April 1981 - June 2002: three "significant" bipod foam losses
STS-112, October 2002: significant foam loss
STS-113, November 2002: night time, but they saw 112 and went "oh shit" and wrote a report
STS-107, January 2003: yet another, fatal, significant foam loss
If two of the last three flights had foam problems and the one that didn't only didn't because you couldn't see if it did, and over 100 of the preceding flights only had three, you don't risk four more lives.
You start designing a memorial at Arlington.
Death by PowerPoint: the slide that killed seven people (2019) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30615114 - March 2022 (197 comments)
Death by PowerPoint: The slide that killed seven people - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19668161 - April 2019 (127 comments)
The first time I came across this blog post a few years ago, I found it enraging, and I still do. As I said I said in my personal notes at the time, "The choice to use this fabricated material for this article and the false claims in it—claims not actually confirmed by the sources that it cites—amounts to what would be considered serious misconduct elsewhere." But there's no real accountability here, of course, because at the end of the day it's just some jerk with a blog serving up distorted pop science insights to aspiring entrepreneurs.
Some previous discussions:
2022: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30615114
2019: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19668161
While it does not wash the responsibility of the executives, the engineers have also the responsibility to be clear in their communication
Then you shouldn't be in charge of communicating highly technical subject matter to decision makers, especially if lives are at stake.
I am consistently ranked as both one of the best engineers in my company and one of the best communicators. I would never make a slide like that for any audience. It's shit writing for non-engineers and it's shit writing for engineers, too.
You have got to get over whatever this hangup is about "PhD level analysis". That phrase doesn't mean anything.
But you are right, most engineers would consider that reasonable, while complaining about the "muggles" that just don't get it.
As a Software Architect, one of my main responsibilities has been to take information presented like above and turn it into something that non-technical people can digest.
Being able to express a complex concept in simple terms is an invaluable skill.
The principles of that slide apply to a lot of other circumstances.
https://armsandinfluence.typepad.com/photos/arms_and_influen...
Has anyone checked in with Daesh about their Q3 OKRs?
> Everything is fine.
> Stuff is good.
> There's no problem.
> It's all going great.
> Actually, everyone on board is likely to die.
What makes you think this, given the subsequent events?
You can’t force someone to think but you can force a lot of people not to, or you can make it difficult to avoid. It’s worth investing the energy into stacking the deck the right way.
I can be kind of a pain in the ass when it comes to details so I’ve worked on a couple such projects. It’s sobering, but also I think, “better me than” half a dozen corner cutters at my last two jobs. They could do much worse.
That said, I stayed on a commercial aerospace project about 14 months after I didn’t really want to be there because people kept saying the wrong things in meetings and thinking they sounded right.
Second, that's irrelevant to my point that the engineer is responsible for communicating, not just figuring stuff out. You cannot say "if you don't get it, that's your problem" when their not getting it means people die.
This slide was presented with a verbal talk track, and anyone who can't handle focusing on the topic because the slide is boring shouldn't be in a position of responsibility.
So on the remote chance you're not just trolling: If you're doing anything safety critical, please quit your job before you kill someone. You vastly overestimate human's (including yours) ability to process information. I am being 100% sincere.
You want the most important information in the right places, communicated with as few words as possible, using the most accurate words possible.
You want the key takeaways to be the things that people are most likely to remember from each slide.
You want to minimize distractions and try not to pollute slides with a bunch of vaguely related stuff. A crowded slide risks communicating nothing.
It's a real dramatic change compared to how I am used to using powerpoint for technical audiences or when I had to make presentations during school.
So you’re better off either opening with the conclusion or putting it on the next slide, but accidentally jumping two slides forward can still ruin your audience’s attention span. So sometimes it’s better for it not to be in the deck at all.
If they've largely grown up in the social media era and click away from reels/shorts that don't have animated captions, you'd design a very different deck.
It also shows why software engineers are superior engineers. The history of software engineering has some single-digit kills, at most 20 in total. Meanwhile, shuttle engineers are supposed to be the best in the aerospace business and they've lost some 13 or so? All aerospace would be put in the thousands.
An old saying is "Any fool can build a bridge. It takes an engineer to build a bridge that barely stands". But these are fools who built bridges that didn't stand.
One day, I will teach them real engineering: It is Rails backend with React frontend. Zero kills. Life above all.
BTW: Here's is the original content with Tufte review https://www.edwardtufte.com/wp-content/uploads/bboard/images...